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“Survival of the fittest” is inevitable demand and inherent law of market 
economy. As one of economic entity, commercial bank is theoretically not exception. 
However, the commercial bank is the core of a national financial system, with 
functions of providing financial public products. Therefore, bankruptcy and close 
down of a badly-managed commercial bank is very different from an ordinary market 
entity. Compromising and assisting a bank blindly, or implementing bankruptcy 
liquidation recklessly is neither the best choice to solve the issue.  
 
In the context of continuously breaking out of sub-prime mortgage crisis and 
European debt crisis, a vital issue that China encounters currently is how to defuse 
existing crisis in commercial banks. Essentially, resolving a bank crisis is a process of 
exploring financial stability and efficiency equilibrium. For a long time, China tries to 
manage with some administrative measures to deal with those unsuccessful 
commercial banks, such as taking over, trusteeship, or close-down. Different from 
above means, the commercial bank bankruptcy reorganization method is more 
procedurally legal and credible, as it use judicial aid method to save commercial 
banks, which are still hopeful and suitable for reorganization. Nevertheless, for those 
banks with no hope of saving, liquidation exit also ensures bank operation and even 
its exit veritably market-oriented..  
 
This article includes three parts, which are introduction, main body and 
conclusion. And the main body is divided into five chapters. The specific point of 
view is as follows: 
  
By analyzing the background and significance of the topic, the introduction part 
of the article introduces the researches of commercial bank bankruptcy reorganization 
made by scholars from China and other countries, explains clearly research content 
and methods of this article, as well as its practical significance to China. 
 
The first chapter states some basic theories and development of commercial bank 
bankruptcy reorganization. Bankruptcy reorganization is a positive measure for 
maintaining or restoring the financial position of a bank already went bankrupt or is 
close to bankrupt, but is still hopeful. Appling bankruptcy reorganization system to 
commercial banks complies with the principle of efficiency, order, and equality value 















of Social Solidarity”; “Theory of Corporation Relationship”, “Corporate Social 
Responsibility Theory”, and “Corporate Sustainable Development Value Theory”, 
provide with theoretical basis of economic, sociology, and law respectively. 
Moreover, the fundamental principle of the commercial bank bankruptcy 
reorganization shall include five elements, namely, stable priority, open and 
transparent, lowest cost, and rapidly handling. 
 
The second chapter mainly talks about the position and balancing of participants 
in the commercial bank bankruptcy reorganization. Deferent from general bankruptcy 
reorganization, bank bankruptcy reorganization participants includes the debtors, 
courts, managers, as well as Banking Regulators, Central Bank, the Department of 
Finance, Deposit Insurance Agency etc. Moreover, the Central Bank and finance 
sector should focus on macro-management and should only maintain the financial 
stability with public funds when it is necessary, with the identity as “lender of last 
resort”. Banking Regulators and Deposit Insurance Agency is ought to participate in 
the commercial bank bankruptcy reorganization. The Banking Regulator is 
responsible to appoint members of the Board of Directors, senior managements, 
contact buyers and coordinate with other departments. In addition, the Banking 
Regulator suggests the commercial bank bankruptcy reorganization in terms of the 
standard of regulatory. The Deposit Insurance Agency, as a reorganization manager, 
operates and maintains assets, and give advices on the plan of reorganization. 
Furthermore, the Deposit Insurance Agency, is entitled to access to the liquidation 
procedure when reorganized become failed. The commercial bank bankruptcy 
reorganization should submit to the jurisdiction of the court, no matter how many 
governmental powers participated in.  
 
The third chapter discusses the issues of triggering commercial bank bankruptcy 
reorganization and its application rights. Currently, international accepted standard 
including: Balance Sheet Standards, Liquidity Standards, and Regulatory Standards. 
Since each standard has its particular flaw if use respectively, all three of these 
standards should be adhered to for the commercial bank bankruptcy reorganization, 
which ensures mutual supplementary. In practice, Specific creditors, debtors, 
shareholders, Banking Regulators, Deposit Insurance Corporations have the right to 
apply for reorganize bankruptcy about banking crisis.  
 
The Chapter four investigates the scheme of the commercial bank bankruptcy 
reorganization and the judicial procedure. This scheme is the core of the whole 
reorganized program, shall be developed by the manager with the involvement of 















department of regulator is supervising scheme. Besides, the reorganized scheme shall 
state clearly the measures of reorganization, creditor’s rights debt paying off, detailed 
implementation programs and deadline. The court conducts formal examination of 
application of bankruptcy reorganization of the commercial bank , and has an 
obligation to select reorganized mangers. If a scheme of reorganization is not 
approved unanimously by each voting group, the manager and the regulator should 
negotiated with those opponents and put the scheme for a second vote. The court may 
approve a scheme by force if it is not approved in the second vote, but need to 
satisfied with the minimum margin and adhere to the principles of fairness and 
reasonableness.   
 
Since China has not yet established a commercial bank bankruptcy system, 
Chapter five proposes that the realistic significance in Chinese commercial bank 
bankruptcy reorganization legal system is setting up a sense of risk in the public that 
“bank is enterprise, and may go bankrupt” in the light of drafting “Banking Financial 
Institutions Bankruptcy Ordinance”. Therefore, China should quickly establish 
specific laws about the commercial bank bankruptcy reorganization system in 
accordance with national conditions. The system should be led by the bank regulator, 
with the court participate in and make final decision.  
 
The conclusion part summarizes the article and points out that the choice of 
bankruptcy reorganization method to solve the crisis in commercial bank operation is 
mainly because that the system is with neither very prominent advantages, nor 
obvious defects, but is the most balanced one. After all, as the bankruptcy 
reorganization system is a newborn and it involves in many interdisciplinary issues 
when applied to commercial banks, there are many issues left for scholars to research 
further. 
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